The book deals with the notion of Downward Causation from a wide array of perspectives, including physics, biology, psychology, social science, communication studies, text theory, and philosophy. The book includes proponents as well as opponents discussing the validity of the notion.

Originally published in 1969. This book explains what is wrong with the traditional methodology of "inductive" reasoning and shows that the alternative scheme of reasoning associated with Whewell, Pierce and Popper can give the scientist a useful insight into the way he thinks.

Social and political scientists, historians and others, have put forward a number of widely differing views concerning the ‘character’ of Islamic millenarian and/or Mahdist movements in Africa. The same is true of course with regard to the opinions ofscholars concerning the transformative capacity of Islam as an ideology. In this paper I want to look at one aspect only of Islamic millenarianism in the West African context, viz. its allegedly revolutionary character.

Imperatives cannot be true, but they can be obeyed or binding: `Surrender!' is obeyed if you surrender and is binding if you have a reason to surrender. A pure declarative argument — whose premisses and conclusion are declaratives — is valid exactly if, necessarily, its conclusion is true if the conjunction of its premisses is true; similarly, I suggest, a pure imperative argument — whose premisses and conclusion are imperatives — is obedience-valid (alternatively: bindingness-valid) exactly if, necessarily, its conclusion is (...) obeyed (alternatively: binding) if the conjunction of its premisses is. I argue that there are two kinds of bindingness, and that a vacillation between two corresponding variants of bindingness-validity largely explains conflicting intuitions concerning the validity of some pure imperative arguments. I prove that for each of those two variants of bindingness-validity there is an equivalent variant of obedience-validity. Finally, I address alternative accounts of pure imperative inference. (shrink)

P. B. Downing; VII.—Subjunctive Conditionals, Time Order, and Causation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 125–140.

Dit boek is een inleiding in het denken over recht en staat met een zwaar accent op de vraag hoe de staat om moet gaan met religie. 0Paul Cliteur en Afshin Ellian zijn hoogleraar encyclopedie van de rechtswetenschap aan de universiteit van Leiden.

Originally published in 1969. This book explains what is wrong with the traditional methodology of "inductive" reasoning and shows that the alternative scheme of reasoning associated with Whewell, Pierce and Popper can give the scientist a useful insight into the way he thinks.

De redactie van Philosophia Reformata heeft een belangrijk project opgezet. Aan de schrijvers van het boek van de Open Universiteit waaraan vertegenwoordigers van verschillende levensbeschouwelijke richtingen hebben meegewerkt, is de mogelijkheid geboden met elkaar in dialoog te treden. De bijdrage van Kees Klop biedt daarvoor om verschillende redenen een uitstekende basis. Ik heb het getroffen met een commentator die de lijn van mijn verhaal voortreffelijk heeft samengevat. We behoeven dus geen tijd te verdoen met het rechtzetten van misverstanden, iets dat (...) doorgaans een belangrijk onderdeel vormt van reacties. Ik vlei mij een beetje met de gedachte dat Klops sympathieke weergave van de essentie van mijn betoog ook wellicht daarom zo goed geslaagd is, omdat wij putten uit ten dele verwant gedachtengoed. Ik ben namelijk, net als Klop, onder de indruk van het werk van Dooyeweerd. Dat gaat terug op de tijd dat ik als student-assistent verbonden was aan de afdeling Encyclopedie van de rechtswetenschap van de VU bij Prof. H.J. van Eikema Hommes. Laatstgenoemde was, zoals de lezers van Philosophia Reformata bekend is, een leerling van Dooyeweerd. (shrink)

Central to Thomas Sprat's History of the Royal Society was the description and justification of the method adopted and advocated by the Fellows of the Society, for it was thought that it was their method which distinguished them from ancients, dogmatists, sceptics, and contemporary natural philosophers such as Descartes. The Fellows saw themselves as furthering primarily a novel method, rather than a system, of philosophy, and the History gave expression to this corporate self-perception. However, the History's description of their method (...) was not necessarily accurate. Rather, as will be argued below, by a combination of subtle misrepresentation and selective exposition, Sprat portrayed a method which would further the aims of social and ecclesiastical stability and material prosperity, essential for the Royal Society since its continued existence depended upon the creation of a social basis for the institutionalized pursuit of natural philosophy. Some link had to be forged between the activities of the Society and the intellectual and social aspirations of the Restoration. To understand the intent and meaning of Sprat's History and the method there portrayed, we must therefore look to the institutional needs which it fulfilled. (shrink)